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The 1998 Amendment to the Roving Wiretap
Statute: Congress "Could Have" Done Better
BRYAN R. FALLER*
The roving wiretap statute, 18 US.C. § 2518(11)(b) (1994 & Supp. IV
1998), differs from the conventional wiretap statute in that it allows law
enforcement officials to follow the suspect from one location to the next, without
having to seek court authorization to wiretap each location's telephone line.
Congress deemed that such a statute was necessary to combat sophisticated
criminals who switched telephones with the purpose of evading wiretap
surveillance. The original roving wiretap statute, while arguably intrusive, was
constitutional. Although the statute did not comport with the particularity
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, it required that before issuance, the court
had to find that it was the target's purpose to thwart detection, thus necessitating
a roving wiretap. It was this "'purpose to thwart" requirement that courts relied
on to find the statute constitutional. In 1998, near the end of its session and
without ample legislative debate, Congress replaced the 'purpose to thwart"
requirement with the "could have the effect of thwarting" standard
This Note argues that the amended version of the roving wiretap statute is
unconstitutional because the "could have the effect of thwarting" standard is too
easily met and, therefore, will result in general searches. Through an analysis of
the history of electronic surveillance, specifically the original roving wiretap
statute, this Note explains that the '"purpose to thwart" requirement is essential
to the roving wiretap statute's constitutionality. Without the "'purpose to thwart"
requirement, this Note contends, federal law enforcement officials will be able to
obtain roving wiretaps based on everyday activities, without a sufficient showing
of the necessity for roving surveillance. Accordingly, this Note argues that the
amended version of the roving wiretap statute is unconstitutional.
I. INTRODUCTION
These requests belong in some bizarre conspiracy novel, not in serious
legislative documents being circulated at the top levels of federal law
enforcement. 1
With the above observation, Representative Bob Barr, a former federal
prosecutor and analyst for the CIA, alerted the media of the "wish list"
promulgated by the FBI and Department of Justice at the close of the 105th
* I would like to thank Professor Sharon'L. Davies for her support and inspiration. For
their excellent editorial assistance, I would like to give special thanks to Brandy Ritchie, Heidi
Reddert, Jeff Wilhelm, and Michael Duffy. Thanks are also due to my parents for their
unconditional support. This Note is dedicated to my wife, Elizabeth, who has taught me more
than one could ever hope to learn in a classroom.
1 Robyn Blumner, Be Careful What You Say: FBI May Be Listening, CHIC. SUN-TIMEs,
Nov. 3, 1998, at 29 (statement of Rep. Bob Barr).
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Congress.2 This "wish list" contained, among other items, an amendment to 18
U.S.C. § 2518(l1)(b)-the roving wiretap statute.3 A roving wiretap allows
federal law enforcement personnel to place a wiretap on any telephone line from
any location that an individual uses.4 It differs from a conventional wiretap in that
a conventional wiretap can be placed only on a specifically designated telephone
line at a specific location, which has been specified in the wiretap applicati6n.5 A
conventional wiretap allows interception of a particular location's telephone
conversations. Thus, if a target switches telephones, the investigators must
reapply for a wiretap order for the other phone location. Roving wiretaps, on the
other hand, allow investigators to tap any phone that the suspect may use, without
having to seek permission for each change of telephone.6 Furthermore, an
application for a conventional wiretap must identify the location of the facilities
to be wiretapped, whereas a roving wiretap is excused from this requirement.7
Prior to the 1998 amendment, law enforcement officials were required to
demonstrate that a suspect was "purposely" attempting to evade a conventional
wiretap before a roving wiretap could be ordered.8 However, to the delight of the
2 See id.
3 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(b) (1994), amended by Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 604, 112 Stat.
2396, 2413 (1998). For a description of the changes to § 2518(1 1)(b), see infra Part lI.D.2.
From this point forward, this Note will use the term "original roving wiretap statute" to refer to
the original version of the statute enacted in 1986, and the term "amended roving wiretap
statute" to refer to the roving wiretap statute after the 1998 amendment. Changes were made to
both § 2518(1 1)(b) and § 2518(12). Section 2518(12) deals specifically with roving "bugs," not
roving wiretaps. See infra note 44. The focus of this Note is on § 2518(1 1)(b) and, hence, it will
not mention § 2518(12).
4 The original version of the roving wiretap statute required that the officer make a
probable cause showing that the suspect was purposely trying to evade detection. The 1998
amendment to the roving wiretap statute replaced the "purpose" requirement See infra Part
II.D.
5 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (1994) (conventional wiretap statute) with 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(l1)(b) (1994), amended by Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 604, 112 Stat. 2396, 2413 (1998)
(roving wiretap statute).
6 See Clifford S. Fishman, Interception of Communications in Exigent Circumstances: The
Fourth Amendment, Federal Legislation, and the United States Department ofJustice, 22 GA.
L. REv. 1, 49 (1987) (explaining that authorization to conduct a roving wiretap allows
investigators to tap any phone that a suspect uses).
7 The 1998 amendment does not change this aspect of § 2518(1 1)(b). Neither the original
nor the amended roving wiretap statute requires that the location from where the
communications are to be intercepted be disclosed. For a detailed analysis of the purpose for
roving wiretaps, see infra Part I.B.; see generally Fishman, supra note 6, at 48-49 (giving a
detailed analysis of the birth of the roving wiretap); Michael Goldsmith, Eavesdropping
Reform: The Legality ofRoving Surveillance, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 401,409-11 (1987) (same).
8 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1 1)(b) (1994) (stating that "the applicant makes a showing of a
purpose on the part of [the target] to thwart interception by changing facilities').
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Clinton Administration and the Department of Justice,9 the 1998 amendment
removed the purpose requirement, thus making it much easier to obtain a roving
wiretap.' 0 Indeed, the American public should be alarmed with this amendment
for two reasons. First, in removing the "purpose" requirement, Congress greatly
expanded the scope of an already "intrusive" law.11 Second, the passage of this
amendment, without ample debate, appears particularly dubious.12
The 1998 amendment to the roving wiretap statute removed a key mens rea
(intent) element from the original roving wiretap statute.13 The mens rea element
that was removed was the "purpose to thwart" requirement. This requirement
limited the instances in which a roving wiretap could be ordered. Moreover, the
"purpose to thwart" requirement was the leg upon which courts stood to find the
9Both entities have repeatedly sought to expand the ability to use roving wiretap
surveillance. See generally James X. Dempsey, Communications Privacy in the Digital Age:
Revitalizing the Federal Wiretap Laws to Enhance Privacy, 8 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TE-cH. 65, 114
(1997) (explaining that the Justice Department wanted to change the standard to obtain a roving
wiretap from an inquiry of the target's intent into an objective inquiry); David B. Kopel &
Joseph Olson, Preventing a Reign of Terror: Civil Liberties Implications of Terrorism
Legislation, 21 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 247, 313 n.233 (1996) (explaining that Clinton was a
strong supporter of less judicial involvement in the process of obtaining a roving wiretap during
the debate of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996); Timothy Lynch,
Dereliction of Duty: The Constitutional Record of President Clinton, 27 CAP. U.L. REV. 783,
803-04 (1999) (explaining that Clinton is a supporter of less judicial involvement in wiretap
procedures).
10 See Intelligence Authorization Act for 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 604, 112 Stat.
2396,2413 (1998).
11 See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63 (1967) ("Few threats to liberty exist
which are greater than that posed by the use of eavesdropping devices.") While acknowledging
that electronic surveillance is inherently intrusive, this Note also recognizes the strict limitations
that are put on electronic surveillance under Title III. See infra Part IIA.2. Roving wiretaps, like
conventional wiretaps, are intrusive because they enable the government to listen to private
conversations. However, with significant limitations placed on the government, the potential for
abuse is greatly reduced. The 1998 amendment removes a vital limitation on roving wiretaps
and accordingly increases the possibility of abuse.
12 See infra notes 67-88 and accompanying text.
13 See Intelligence Authorization Act for 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 604, 112 Stat.
2396, 2413 (1998). Before the 1998 amendment, the roving wiretap statute required that the
applicant provide probable cause that the criminal suspect was purposely trying to evade
detection. It read in pertinent part: "the application identifies the person believed to be committing
the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted and the applicant makes a showing of
purpose, on the part of that person, to thwart interception by changing facilities. . . ." 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(1 1)(b)(ii) (1994) (emphasis added), amended by Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 604, 112 Stat.
2396, 2413 (1998). The amended version of § 2518(1 1)(b)(ii) states: "the application
identi[f]ies the person believed to be committing the offense and whose communications are to
be intercepted and the applicant makes a showing that there is probable cause to believe that the
person's actions could have the effect of thwarting interception from a specified facility...
18 U.S.C. § 2518(1 1)(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (emphasis added).
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original roving wiretap statute constitutional.14 The 1998 amendment, however,
replaced the "purpose to thwart" requirement with the "could have the effect of
thwarting" standard.
The roving wiretap statute, as amended, endangers personal privacy;
undoubtedly, courts will be forced to decide whether the amended statute is
constitutional. Specifically, the courts will have to decide whether the amended
statute, which allows a roving wiretap to be issued if a target's actions could have
the effect of thwarting conventional wiretap surveillance, violates the particularity
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.15
This Note argues that the amended roving wiretap statute is unconstitutional
because, in eliminating a key mens rea element, the statute now fails to meet the
particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment. In Part II, this Note provides
a brief overview of electronic surveillance of communications-from Title Ill of
the Omnibus Crime and Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to the adoption of
the 1998 amendment. Part III analyzes the "purpose" requirement of the original
version of the roving wiretap statute. Part IV explains that the removal of the
"purpose" requirement in the amended version of the statute is unconstitutional
because it fails to meet the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment
Finally, this Note concludes by suggesting that although roving wiretaps are
arguably intrusive, they are constitutional when the "purpose to thwart"
requirement is an element of the statute.
II. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF COMMuNICATIoNs: FROM TrILE III TO
THE 1998 A9ENDN 6
The issues surrounding the electronic surveillance of communications by law
enforcement officials have been a steadfast subject of legal debate.17 Arguably,
14 See generally United States v. Gaytan, 74 F.3d 545 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Petti, 973 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Parks, No. 95 CR 510, 1997 WL 136761
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 1997); United States v. Villegas, No. 92 CR 699(CSH), 1993 WL 535013
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1993); United States v. Silberman, 732 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D. Cal. 1990),
ajf'd, 973 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1992).
15 For an explanation of the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement, see infra Part
IV.A.
16To enable the reader to better understand why the 1998 amendment to the roving
wiretap statute is constitutionally questionable, this Note provides an historical description of
electronic surveillance law. Sections IHA. and lI.B. attempt to educate the reader on the
limitations placed upon electronic surveillance. In observing the historical development of
electronic surveillance, this Note permits the reader to better understand what roving
surveillance is, how it differs from conventional wiretap surveillance, and, most importantly,
why the 1998 amendment to the roving wiretap statute stands in stark contrast to the idea of
limiting electronic surveillance.
17 See, e.g., Dempsey, supra note 9, at 68 (addressing the privacy issues concerning new
communications and computer technologies and the needs of law enforcement); Fishman,
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electronic surveillance of communications, no matter what the form, is
intrusive.18 Because of its intrusive nature, Congress has, over the years,
promulgated legislation that provides the prerequisites which must be satisfied in
order to legally intercept another's communications.
19
A. Title MII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
1. Berger v. New York
The Supreme Court addressed, for the first time, how the Fourth Amendment
applies to court-ordered electronic surveillance by government officials in the
1967 landmark decision of Berger v. New York 20 In Berger, the Court held that
New York's eavesdrop statute2 l was "too broad in its sweep," and thus would
lead to "general searches" that would violate the Fourth Amendment.2 2 The Court
supra note 6, at 20-21 (examining the constitutionality of electronic surveillance legislation);
Goldsmith, supra note 7, at 109-11 (describing roving surveillance).
18 See supra note 11. Electronic surveillance has been considered to be more intrusive than
the physical searches and seizures permitted by the Fourth Amendment See id. This is because
unlike conventional search warrants, which must identify the area to be searched, electronic
surveillance is inherently indiscriminate. See Dempsey, supra note 9, at 69-70 (explaining that
electronic surveillance, such as a wiretap, provides law enforcement officials with "all of the
target's communications, whether they are relevant to the investigation" or not). Furthermore,
in the execution of a conventional search warrant, an announcement of the authority and
purpose is required. This "knock and notice" rule is essential so that a person whose privacy is
being invaded can observe the search and seek judicial remedy for any violations. However,
electronic surveillance is usually conducted "surreptitiously," without the "knock and notice" of
conventional searches. See id at 68.
19 See infra Part II.A.
20388 U.S. 41 (1967); see also 1 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA,
WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING § 1:4, at 1-6 (2d ed. 1995) (explaining that Congress
enacted Title 11m in an effort to comport electronic surveillance legislation with the requirements
set forth in Berger).
2 1 N.Y. CIUM. PROC. LAW § 813-a (McKinney 1958), construed in Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41,43 n.1 (1967). The statute read in pertinent part:
An ex parte order for eavesdropping... may be issued by any justice of the supreme court
orjudge... upon oath or affirmation of a district attorney, or of the attorney-general or of
an officer above the rank of sergeant of any police department of the state ... that there is
reasonable ground to believe that evidence of crime may be thus obtained, and particularly
describing the person or persons whose communications ... are to be overheard or
recorded ... and, in the case of a telegraphic or telephonic communication, identifying the
particular telephone number or telegraph line involved.
Id.
22 Berger, 388 U.S. at 43-44. The Court held that although the statute satisfied the Fourth
Amendment's requirement of a detached and neutral magistrate, "the broad sweep of the statute
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did not hold that electronic surveillance was per se unconstitutional but instead
that the New York statute failed to meet the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment.23 In its decision, the Court laid the framework for the constitutional
requirements for electronic surveillance.
In Berger, the Court outlined seven constitutional requirements for court-
ordered electronic surveillance:24 (1) a probable cause showing that a particular
offense has been or is about to be committed; (2) the applicant must describe with
particularity the conversations to be intercepted; (3) the surveillance must be for a
specific and limited period of time in order to minimize the invasion of privacy;
(4) there must be continuing probable cause showings if the surveillance is to
continue beyond the original termination date; (5) the surveillance must cease
once the conversation sought is seized; (6) notice must be given unless there is an
adequate showing of exigency; and (7) a return on the warrant is required so that
the court may oversee and limit the use of the intercepted conversations3 5 With
such requirements before it, it was not long before Congress enacted a law that
followed the Berger requirements.
2. Title I17
'Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
empowers law enforcement officials to seek, and judges to issue, court orders
authorizing the interception of 'wire communications,' 'oral communications,'
and, since 1986, 'electronic communications."' 26 In promulgating Title I,27
Congress sought to include the constitutional requirements set forth in Berger v.
New York28 and Katz v. United States29 for electronic surveillance.3 0 Title Ill
[was] immediately observable." Id. at 54.23 Justice Clark, while recognizing that the potential for abuse in electronic surveillance
was great, held that it can be within the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment See id. at 62-64.
In response to the argument that it would be impossible to draft a warrant or statute to meet the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment, Justice Clark noted that "this Court has in the past,
under specific conditions and circumstances, sustained the use of eavesdropping devices." Ia at
63 (citations omitted).
24 See id at 58-61. For an analysis of these requirements, see I FISHMAN & MCKENNA,
supra note 20, at 1-6 to 1-7.
25 Berger, 388 U.S. at 58-61; see also 1 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 20, at 1-6 to
1-7.
2 6 Fishman, supra note 6, at 23-24.
2 7 See Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 211 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2522 (1994)).
28 388 U.S. 41 (1967). For a listing of these requirements, see text accompanying notes
24-25.
29 389 U.S. 347, 355-59 (1967) (reaffirming the requirements for electronic surveillance
set forth in Berger and holding that a detached and neutral magistrate must determine the scope
of the surveillance).
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includes several requirements that, while not constitutionally mandated, establish
further procedural and substantive prophylactic measures incorporated by
Congress.31 One such example is that unlike conventional search warrants, which
may be issued by a federal magistrate judge, electronic surveillance may be
authorized by district or circuit court judges only.32
Title MI also describes who may authorize a wiretap application, the
information that the application must contain, and the requirements that a judge
must find before authorizing a wiretap.33 Other requirements set forth by Title TI
include the following: how the wiretap is to be executed, what the notice
requirements are, and what crimes may be investigated by utilization of a
wiretap.34 One specific requirement in Title I, especially relevant to this Note, is
the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment 35 Title 1H[ requires that an
application for a wiretap be "particular" as to: the particular offense that has been,
is being, or is about to be committed; a particular description of the nature and
location of the facilities from which, or the place where, the communication is to
be intercepted, a particular description of the type of communications sought to
be intercepted; and the identity of the suspect if it is known. 36
30 See Fishman, supra note 6, at 25 (explaining that Title Ill was in response to the
Supreme Court's decisions in Berger and Katz).
3 1 See id. (explaining that Title II does more than "merely parallel the Fourth Amendment
and Supreme Court decisions').
32 See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(9Xa) (1994). This Note asserts that because electronic
surveillance is inherently more intrusive than searches permitted by a conventional search
warrant, this heightened judicial personnel requirement is necessary. For example, issuance of a
conventional search warrant results in a fairly quick turnaround-the search is conducted and
either contraband is found or it is not. With electronic surveillance, however, the "search" is not
so quick. Wiretaps can last up to thirty days, and, under the usual circumstances, the suspect has
no idea that his phone is being tapped. This type of prolonged search deserves the attention of a
district court or circuit court judge who usually determines if a contested search warrant is
constitutional.
3 3 See I FIHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 20, at 1-10 to 1-18 (explaining the
requirements of Title DI).
34 For an excellent analysis of the requirements set forth by Title Hm, see Fishman, supra
note 6, at 23-35. Professor Fishman gives a detailed explanation and analysis of the
requirements of Title III, including relevant legislative history; see also JAMES G. CARR, THE
LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 2.3, at 2-5 to 2-7 (2d ed. 1987) (detailing the legislative
history of Title 111); 1 FiSHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 20, at 1-10 to 1-18 (explaining the
requirements of Title M11).
35 See infra Part VA. The Fourth Amendment provides in part that "no Warrant shall
issue, but upon.. .particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
36 See IS U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b) (1994).
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B. Birth of the Roving Wiretap-The Electronic Communications Privacy
Act of 1986
Roving surveillance is a product of new technologies.3 7
After nearly two decades of relative calm, Title Ill was amended in 1986 by
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)38 to bring Title III up to date
with the technological advances that had occurred during the previous twenty
years.39 With the advent of devices such as cellular telephones, electronic mail,
and facsimiles, "the Justice Department, civil libertarians and numerous
subdivisions of the telecommunications industry" requested a rewrite of the law,
which resulted in the ECPA.4° As a result of the ECPA, the roving wiretap
provision was among the most significant and dramatic amendments to Title 11.41
The roving wiretap is not a technological advancement. Rather, roving
wiretaps employ the same technology as conventional wiretaps. The difference
between a conventional wiretap, under Title IH, and a roving wiretap, under the
ECPA, is statutory in nature: A conventional wiretap application must specify the
telephone line to be tapped, but a roving wiretap is expressly excused from this
requirement 2 In other words, an application for a roving wiretap need not
specify which telephone an officer wishes to wiretap; instead, the statute permits
the officer to wiretap any telephone that the suspect uses.
The necessity of roving surveillance became evident when law enforcement
officials noticed that sophisticated criminals began using increased caution to
avoid possible wiretaps and other forms of electronic surveillance.43 In addition,
37 Goldsmith, supra note 7, at 409 (explaining that the roving wiretap was "born" to allow
federal investigators to place taps on individuals who were utilizing new technologies to evade
conventional wiretap surveillance).
38 Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986). For an exhaustive review of the ECPA, see
Fishman, supra note 6, at 48-69.
39 1 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 20, at 1-18 to 1-19 (explaining that Title I had
not kept pace with advances in telecommunications and thus was in dire need of an
amendment).
40ld.
41 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11) (1994). For a detailed analysis of the original roving wiretap
statute, see Goldsmith, supra note 7, at 409-11, 415-25 (explaining the origins and
constitutionality of roving surveillance).
42See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(ii) (1994). An application for a conventional wiretap shall
include "a particular description of the nature and location of the facilities from which or the
place where the communication is to be intercepted .... "
4 3 See Goldsmith, supra note 7, at 410. There are multitudes of possible scenarios in
which a person may try to evade detection. First, a person could avoid detection by frequently
switching from his home telephone to his cellular telephone (or several cellular telephones).
Another mainer in which a person could thwart detection would be to go from one public pay
telephone to another.
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many criminals remain engaged in relevant conversations on a continuous basis
while moving from one location to the next. 4 But, as criminals became more
sophisticated, so did technology, allowing officers to easily target criminals who
moved from one location to the next.45
Not surprisingly, the roving wiretap is the federal investigator's dream,
because it lacks the requirements of specifying the exact location or showing
probable cause to believe that the place from where the communication is to be
intercepted is being used in connection with some offense 4 6
C. Statutory Differences Between Conventional and Roving Wiretaps
The ECPA added § 2518(11) and (12) to the conventional wiretap statute 4 7
The statute, providing for roving wiretaps, differs from conventional wiretaps in
four respects. First, it requires a higher level of authority to authorize an
application for a roving wiretap than is required to authorize an application for a
conventional wiretap 4 8 Second, unlike conventional wiretap applications, which
only require that the identity of the target be given if known, the roving wiretap
application must provide the identity of the target.4 9 Third, the roving wiretap
application does not require the law enforcement officer to state the specific
location of the place from where the communication is to be intercepted.50
44 See id. This concern is more likely applicable to subsection (a) of § 2518(11). This
subsection deals with roving "bugs." A "bug" is an instrument that can be placed in small
hidden areas, such as a fire detector of a hotel room, and pick up audio or video
communications that occur in the hotel room. This subsection was not amended by the 1998
amendments.
45 See id. (explaining that advances in technology allowed lav enforcement officials to
wiretap criminals who moved from one location to the next to evade surveillance).
4 6 After being granted a roving wiretap, the investigating officer has free reign to place the
wiretap anywhere the target goes. See 1 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 20, at 9-14
(explaining that "[o]nce a roving intercept order is issued, there is no express limitation on the
number of places in which the government can install listening devices or telephones it can tap,
and the decision in each instance [is] an executive rather than a judicial one"). But see id. at 9-
14 n.30 (explaining that often investigators are left to ensure that searches do not violate the
Fourth Amendment).
4 7 See Electronic Communications Privacy Act, § 106(d)(3), 100 Stat. 1848, 1857 (1986).
The relevant provision for this Note is § 2518(1 1)(b) concerning "wire or electronic
communication."
48See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(b)(i) (1994), amended by Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 604, 112
Stat. 2396,2413 (1998).
49 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(iv) (1994) (conventional wiretap) with 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(1 l)(b)(ii) (1994), amended by Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 604, 112 Stat. 2396, 2413 (1998)
(roving wiretap).
50 In essence, this is where the statute got the name "roving." The wiretap is roving
because it need not be static-it may rove from telephone to telephone. This is different from a
conventional wiretap, which must include in the application "a particular description of the
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Finally, to obtain a roving wiretap, there need not be a probable cause finding by
a judge that the place from where the communication is being intercepted is being
used in connection with some criminal offense.51
1. High-Level Officials
The first requirement in an application for a roving wiretap is that it be sought
by a "high-level federal official." 52 The roving wiretap statute requires
authorization for an application to be given by "the Attorney General, the Deputy
Attorney General, the Associate Attorney General, an Assistant Attorney General,
or an acting Assistant Attorney General. '53 Though the legislative history of the
1986 Amendments makes no mention of the reasoning behind this requirement, it
seems to exist to protect against potential abuse.54 There is a greater potential for
abuse because a roving wiretap enables federal officials to follow the target from
one location to the next, monitoring every phone conversation the suspect makes
during the day.55 Accordingly, it is proper to require a higher level official to
authorize such an application.56
2. Requiring the Target's Identity
A further attempt to guard against the inherent abuse associated with a roving
wiretap is the requirement that the applicant: "identif[y] the person believed to be
committing the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted .... 57
nature and location of the facilities from which or the place where the communication is to be
intercepted." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(ii) (1994).
51 This, too, is a major deviation from the standards of a conventional wiretap. A
conventional wiretap application states that there must be a probable cause finding that the
place from where the interception is being taken is involved in or is about to be involved in
criminal activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(d) (1994).
52By "high-level federal official," this Note indicates that § 2518(11) requires that an
application by a federal law enforcement officer be authorized by an authority higher than that
required to authorize conventional wiretaps.
53 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1 1)(b)(i) (1994), amended by Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 604, 112 Stat.
2396, 2413 (1998); cf 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1994) (allowing a conventional wiretap to be
ordered by any "Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division").
5 4 See Fishman, supra note 6, at 50. This Note indicates that "a roving tap ... is potentially
far more intrusive into privacy than a standard interception order, so it is even more important
to centralize the policy decisions in a 'publicly responsible official subject to the political
process."' Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 2185 (1968)).
5 5 See id at 62.
5 6 See id at 50 (explaining that this leaves a decision as important as one to grant a roving
wiretap to a "publicly responsible official subject to the political process").
57 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(b)(ii) (1994), amended by Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 604, 112 Stat.
2396, 2413 (1998).
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This identity requirement is narrower than that for conventional wiretaps, which
require that the identity of the person be made available only if it is known.58
Requiring federal investigators to identify the criminal suspect may have been
Congress's effort to substitute the particularity of the target's identity for the
particularity of the location or place of the wiretap.59
3. Specification of Location
The third difference between a roving wiretap and a conventional wiretap is
the location requirement; this difference is the essence of "roving surveillance."
Unlike conventional wiretap applications, which must state in the application the
locality from where the communication is to be intercepted, 60 the location of
where a roving wiretap is to be used need not be present in the application. As
discussed previously, Congress purposely took away the "location" requirement
in promulgating this statute61 because Congress's purpose was to enable federal
law enforcement officials to wiretap suspects who were intentionally trying to
"thwart interception by changing facilities. 62
4. Requirement ofProbable Cause of Criminal Activity
in Location to Be Intercepted
The final difference between the statutory requirements of the roving wiretap
and the conventional wiretap is the requirement of a probable cause showing of
58 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b)(iv) (1994); see also 1 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note
20, at 9-6 (explaining that the requirement that the target be identified in the application for a
roving wiretap is more stringent than the requirement in a conventional wiretap application,
which requires the target's identity be disclosed if it is known).
59 See Fishman, supra note 6, at 51 (observing that this requirement is intended to limit the
availability of roving wiretaps); see also United States v. Petti, 973 F.2d 1441, 1445 (9th Cir.
1992) (observing that the original roving wiretap statute's requirement of identifying the target
helped to prevent roving wiretaps from being unconstitutionally broad). This Note argues that
this requirement alone is not enough to meet the particularity requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. Only when coupled with the "purpose to thwart" requirement of the original
roving wiretap statute is the particularity requirement met.
60 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
61 The purpose of the 1986 amendments to the wiretap statute was to:
set[ ] out new rules for the specificity required in the description of the place where the
interceptions of wire and oral communications are to occur. The Committee finds such a
provision necessary to cover circumstances under which law enforcement officials may
not know, until shortly before the communication, which telephone line will be used by the
person under surveillance.
S. REP. No. 99-541, at 31 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3585.
62 Id. at 32; see also infra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
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criminal activity at the location of the place to be intercepted. A conventional
wiretap application requires that the applicant have probable cause to believe that
the place from where the communications are to be intercepted is being used for
criminal activity.63 This probable cause requirement is excluded from the roving
wiretap statute,64 thereby allowing federal investigators to tap any phone from
any location that a target uses regardless of whether that phone is in a public
place, the suspect's home, or even in the home of an innocent third party.
The statutory differences discussed above greatly relax the requirements of a
wiretap application for roving wiretaps, and yet as originally enacted, the roving
wiretap statute required an applicant to carry an extra burden of proof--namely
that the officer-applicant demonstrate that the suspect was purposely trying to
evade interception.65 Thus, prior to the 1998 amendment, roving wiretaps, while
arguably intrusive, appeared to be constitutional because of the previously
discussed statutory safeguards.
D. Roving Made Much Eqsier-The 1998 Amendment
The 1998 amendment to the roving wiretap statute replaced the "purpose to
thwart' requirement in the original statute with the "could have the effect of
thwarting" standard along with other changes.66 In replacing the "purpose to
thwart" requirement, Congress removed a fundamental safeguard in protecting
against abuses by the issuance of roving wiretaps. This Section analyzes the way
in which the amendment was brought about and the effect of the amendment on
the roving wiretap statute.
1. Amendment by Sneak Attack
Near the close of the 105th Session of Congress "in the legislative dead of
night, Congress gave law enforcement unprecedented new power to wiretap
[private] communications." 67 With little warning and even less legislative
63 The statute states ajudge may order a wiretap if the judge determines on the basis of the
application that:
except as provided in subsection (11), there is probable cause for belief that the facilities
from which, or the place where, the wire ... communication[] [is] to be intercepted are
being used, or are about to be used, in connection with the commission of such offense, or
are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by such person.
18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(d) (1994) (emphasis added).
64 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
65 See § 2518(11)(b)(ii) (1994).
66 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
67 Dan Gillmor, Roving Wiretap Power OK'd Analysis: Congress Granted Law Enforcers
More Authority to Monitor Your Electronic Communications, BALT. SUN, Oct 19, 1998, at IC.
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dialogue, the 105th Congress amended the roving wiretap statute and took away a
key mens rea element. In its place, Congress interjected a standard that even
Barney Fyffe68 could satisfy.6 9 It is unimaginable how an amendment, which
loosens standards on an already arguably intrusive law, could pass without so
much as a committee hearing.
The amendment to the roving wiretap statute70 was added during the
conference report for the intelligence appropriations bill71 as opposed to the
earlier House bill or Senate amendment to the appropriations bill.72 Further, the
Explanatory Statement of the managers of the conference did little to elucidate
why the amendment was necessary to the roving wiretap statute.73 In fact, the
The media was immediately alerted to the passage of the 1998 amendment to the roving
wiretap statute and in the manner in which it was passed. In general, the consensus was not
positive. One editorial went so far as to state, "mI]he president has not been so distracted by the
current [Lewinsky] scandal as to forgo a raid on the Fourth Amendment." Nat Hentoff, Raid on
Rights, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 1999, at A19. Another editorial criticized the FBI, which sought
the amendment, stating, "[t]he FBI always has been good at subterfuge and sneak attacks. Now
it is using them on Congress." Blumner, supra note 1, at 29.
To further illustrate the stealth in the passage of this amendment, one can look to the
telecommunications industry, which was taken by surprise. Specifically, the Cellular
Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA) was caught by surprise. The CTIA now has
to determine when and how cellular carriers will have to implement any required technological
changes required to fulfill the requirement of the amendment. See Law Enforcement Flexes
Wiretap Muscle in Intelligence Authorization, COMM. TODAY, Oct. 12, 1998, at 6.
68 Barney Fyffe is the dimwitted deputy on the 1960s television series The Andy Griffith
Show (CBS 1960-68).
69 For a discussion of the "could have" standard, see infra note 96 and accompanying text
and Part IV.C.
70 See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 604,
112 Stat. 2396, 2413 (1998).
71 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-780, at 32 (1998), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 510,
518. The amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1 1)(b) (1994) was included in the conference report
as section 604, entitled "Wire and Electronic Communications Interception Requirements.'
Section 604 amends 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11), (12) (1994). See infra Part II.C. for changes to the
statute as a result of the amendment.
7 2 See JoiNT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMrIEE OF CONFERENCE, H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 105-780, at 32 (1998), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 510,518.
73 The Joint Explanatory Statement states:
Under current law, judges issue wiretap orders authorizing law enforcement officials
to place a wiretap on a specific telephone number. Criminals, including terrorists and spies,
know this and often fry to avoid wiretaps by using pay telephones on the street at random,
or by using stolen or cloned cell telephones. As law enforcement officials cannot know the
numbers of these telephones in advance, they are unable to obtain a wiretap order on these
numbers from a judge in time to intercept the conversation, and the criminal is able to
evade interception of this communication.
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purpose behind the amendment, to prevent suspects from evading a wiretap, as
indicated by the Joint Explanatory Statement, was already effectuated under the
original version of the roving wiretap statute.74 However, the sponsors of the bill
removed the 'purpose" requirement and substituted it with the "could have"
standard.
Almost as alarming as the amendment itself is the ease in which it was passed
without any legislative debate on the issue. The amendment's sponsor,
Representative McCollum, stated that the amendment in effect was a very minor
change to the statute.75 Representative McCollum played upon the rhetoric of
terrorism to make it appear that this amendment was badly needed.7 6 He argued
that the amendment was necessary because the "purpose" requirement was too
difficult to meet, and he even suggested that the amendment would make the
wiretap law narrower.7 7 Representative McCollum's next contention was that this
This provision addresses this problem by authorizing judges to issue an order
authorizing the interception of all communications made by a particular person, regardless
of what telephone he may use. The provision does not change the existing law that requires
law enforcement officials to show that there is probable cause to believe that the suspect
has committed, or may commit, a crime. With this amendment law enforcement officials
will be required to show that there is probable cause to believe that the actions of the
suspect could have the effect of thwarting a wiretap on a specific telephone were the court
to order the more typical method of wiretap, which targets a specific telephone number.
Id. at 32, reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 518-19 (emphasis added). Emphasis was added to
the Explanatory Statement to indicate the major change to 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(b) (1994) as a
result of the amendment.
74The Joint Explanatory Statement does not indicate how the original version of 18
U.S.C. § 2518(1 1)(b) (1994) failed to meet the purpose as put forth by the Conference
managers. In fact, § 2518(11)(b) was originally enacted to combat the very thing that the
Conference Report addresses-a suspect who tries to evade detection. There is no indication
that this effort was being retarded by the requirement of a showing of a purpose to evade
surveillance as required by the roving wiretap statute.
75 See 144 CONG. REC. H9725, H9731 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep.
McCollum). Representative McCollum noted that the amendment had "given pause to some...
Members" of the Conference report. Id. He tried to dismiss this concern by arguing that the
amendment was a small change to the statute but was a "very significant change in the law
dealing with wiretaps." Id.
76 See id. A similar argument was made for expanded wiretap surveillance after the 1995
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City. See Kopel & Olson, supra
note 9, at 312-13. Kopel and Olson observe that during the debate of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, many called for expanded wiretap surveillance because
they thought that current law restricted the use of wiretaps for investigating suspected terrorism.
However, they point out that out of 2130 wiretap applications in 1993-94, not a single one was
for terrorism. See id.
77 See 144 CONG. REC. H9725, H9731 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep.
McCollum). Representative McCollum made several comments that deserve attention. First, he
stated that this particular issue had been the subject of much debate. See id. To date, no debate
concerning this amendment has been found other than the brief statements made by
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amendment was necessary because the intent requirement was very difficult to
prove.78 It is true that the intent to evade standard may be difficult to establish, but
it is this "purpose" requirement that helps to substitute for the particularity
requirement of the Fourth Amendment and which has been relied upon by courts
to uphold the constitutionality of the amendment.
Representative Barr, ironically a former federal prosecutor and CIA analyst,
rose in opposition not only to the amendment but also to the manner in which it
was being introduced 79 He argued that this amendment was not a minor change
to the existing law but was "a fundamental shift in wiretapping procedures in this
country."'80 Barr stated that without the "purpose" requirement, the roving wiretap
statute would raise serious civil liberties and privacy rights issues.81
In response to Representative Barr's arguments, Representative McCollum
again argued that the amendment was a minor change and resumed to arguing
that it is a "terrorism issue."82 He further stated that the amendment only allows
the issuance of a roving wiretap if a judge finds that the target's "actions show he
Representative McCollum and an effort by Representative Barr to have this issue taken out of
Conference and put into committee. Representative McCollum may have been making
reference to the fact that a similar provision was offered as a part of the 1996 Antiterrorism Act;
however, that provision was soundly defeated.
The final statement put forth by Representative McCollum in support of the amendment is
that this amendment would make the wiretap law narrower. See id. This statement is without
merit. Representative McCollum stated that under the amendment, once the target walks away
from a pay phone where a roving wiretap was placed, the phone cannot be tapped anymore. See
id. This is true with the original version of 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1 1)(b) (1994). Representative
McCollum concludes his selling of the bill by stating that no "[m]ember should mistake this as
some major addition to the wiretap laws." Id.
78 See id.
79 See id at H9737.
80ld.
81 See id Representative Barr argued that with this amendment a roving wiretap could be
ordered without the showing of a purpose on the part of the target to thwart conventional
electronic surveillance means. See id. He also pointed out that this amendment is not limited to
"foreign intelligence surveillance" but to any case in which federal officials seek a roving
wiretap-be it for domestic crimes such as money laundering or intemational crimes such as
terrorism. See id This observation seems to indicate that many in Conference Committee were
persuaded by Representative McCollum's remarks that this amendment was necessary to
combat terrorism. However, as pointed out by Representative Barr, nowhere in the statutory
language or legislative history is it indicated that Congress's intent was for this law to apply
only to terrorism situations. See id.
82 Id. This Note uses the term "terrorism issue" to indicate Representative McCollum's
insistence on trying to indicate that this amendment was limited to terrorists. Though
Representative McCollum never states verbatim that the bill was limited to terrorists, it appears
that he was trying to push the issue to gain empathy from his fellow Representatives. For
example, in defending the amendment Representative McCollum stated that the amendment
"permits the court-ordered wiretap that follows the criminal terrorist suspect to whatever phone
he uses ..... Id (emphasis added).
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is trying to evade the tap .... -"83 However, with the amendment's elimination of
the "purpose" requirement, this is simply not true. The amendment to the statute
allows a roving wiretap to be issued if the suspect's "actions could have the effect
of' evading the tap.84 The "could have" standard is much easier to meet than the
"purpose to thwart' standard.85
Representative Barr attempted to remove section 604 from the appropriations
bill so that it could be fully debated at a later time.86 However, in an effort to pass
the intelligence appropriations bill without delay, his proposal was soundly
defeated.87 Both the House and the Senate adopted the Conference Committee
version, and President Clinton signed it into law on October 20, 1998. 88
The courts that have decided cases involving the original roving wiretap
statute 89 declared it to be constitutional.90 In each of these cases, the individual
courts relied heavily upon the "purpose... to thwart interception!'91
requirement. 92 Thus, it follows that the amended statute is unconstitutional
because it deletes a major element that was used by the courts in finding the
statute constitutional.93 Without the "purpose to thwarf' requirement, the statute
fails to meet the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement.94
83 1d.
84 The amended version of the statute reads in pertinent part: "the application identifies the
person believed to be committing the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted
and the applicant makes a showing that there is probable cause to believe that the person's
actions could have the effect of thwarting interception from a specified facility...."
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 604, 112 Stat.
2396,2413 (1998).
85 See infra Part IV.C.
86 See 144 CONG. REC. H9725, H9739 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep. Barr).
87 The vote was 148 yeas, 267 nays, and 19 not voting. See i at H9739-40.
88 See Statement on Signing the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, 34
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2082 (Oct. 20, 1998).
89 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(b) (1994).
90 For a discussion on decisions of courts upholding the constitutionality of the original
roving wiretap statute, see infra Part III.C.
91 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1 1)(b)(ii) (1994).
92 For a discussion on the reasoning of courts which found the original roving wiretap
statute constitutional, see infia Part III.C.
93 See id
94 The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
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2. Replacement of the "Purpose to Thwart" Requirement
As a result of the 1998 amendments, the requirement that an applicant for a
roving wiretap had to make "a showing of a purpose, on the part of [the target], to
thwart interception '95 was replaced by the "could have" standard. The "could
have" standard appears in the amendment to the roving wiretap statute, which
reads in pertinent part: "[T]he applicant makes a showing that there is probable
cause to believe that the person's actions could have the effect of thwarting
interception from a specified facility .... , 96 The addition of subsection (b)(iv) is
the other change to § 2518(1 1)(b) as a result of the amendment. Subsection (b)(iv)
states: "the order authorizing or approving the interception is limited to
interception only for such time as it is reasonable to presume that the person
identified in the application is or was reasonably proximate to the instrument
through which such communication will be or was transmitted."9 7
According to the Joint Explanatory Statement, this subsection was added to
"ensure that only the conversation of the suspect (and with whomever he speaks)
is intercepted .... 1"98 The Joint Explanatory Statement further stated that the
requirements of this subsection may only be met when it is reasonable to assume
the suspect is "reasonably proximate" to the particular phone being tapped.
The "reasonably proximate" standard also loosens the limitations placed
upon roving surveillance in the original roving wiretap statute. No longer are
officials required to wait until the target is on the telephone or evidences an intent
to use the telephone, but officials can now begin to intercept a communication
when the target is "reasonably proximate" to the telephone. 99 This ability to
wiretap a telephone to which a suspect is "reasonably proximate" will allow the
govemrnment to intercept more innocent conversations than a conventional wiretap
would permit.100
IH. ENSURING ROVING DOES NOT Go Too FAR-
'THE PURPOSE" REQUIREMENT
The "purpose to thwart" requirement in the original roving wiretap statute
guarded against wide open invasion of privacy occurrences. 10 1 This Part
95 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1 1)(b)(ii) (1994), amended by Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 604, 112 Stat. 2396,2413 (1998).
96 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (emphasis added).
97 Id. (emphasis added).
98 JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMM=ITEE OF CONFERENCE, H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 105-780, at 33 (1998), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 510,519.
99 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
100 See infira Part IV.D.
101 The amended version of§ 2518(11)(bXii), which does not contain the "purpose... to
thwarT' language, will have a significant impact on personal privacy as it will now be much
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describes the importance of the "purpose" requirement in statutory context and
the reliance placed upon it by courts in finding the original roving wiretap statute
constitutional.
A- Purpose-King of the Mens Rea Mountain
In order to obtain a roving wiretap under the original roving wiretap statute,
the applicant had to make "a showing of purpose, on the part of [the suspect], to
thwart interception... ."102 In determining the meaning of a statute, it is
imperative to begin with the statutory language.'0 3 Accordingly, when trying to
ascertain the requirements to obtain a roving wiretap statute, one must look to the
statute. The requirement in the ECPA, which provided the most protection against
the arbitrary issuance of a roving wiretap and which was relied upon by the
courts1 04 in upholding the constitutionality of the statute, was the "purpose to
thwart' requirement.
'Turpose" is atop the list of the Model Penal Code's culpability
requirements' 0 5 and thus is the highest scienter requirement recognized by the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code. According to the drafters of the
Model Penal Code, an action is not purposeful "unless it was [the actor's]
conscious object to perform an action of that nature or to cause such a result."106
Although a person does not commit a statutory offense by trying to evade a
wiretap, Congress intended the mens rea element to be present prior to a valid
issuance of a roving wiretap. The legislative history is not conclusive as to why
Congress used the term "purpose."'10 7 However, examples given by the drafters of
the ECPA illustrate that they intended a requirement similar to the definition used
by the Model Penal Code.10 8 In addition, as roving wiretaps are more intrusive
easier for federal law enforcement officials to conduct roving wiretaps.
102 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1 1)(b)(ii) (1994).
103 Justice Frankfurter instructed his students that the most fimdamental step in statutory
interpretation is to "(1) [r]ead the statute; (2) read the statute; (3) read the statue!" HENRY J.
FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 202 (1967).
104 See infra Part HI.C.
105 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) (1985). The Codereads in pertinentpart:
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his
conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of
such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.
Id But see generally Sharon L. Davies, The Jurisprudence of Wilfidness: An Evolving Theory
of Excusable Ignorance, 48 DUKE L.J. 341 (1998) (explaining that the mens rea term "willful"
may be the highest scienter requirement).
106 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 commentary at 233 (1985).
107 See Fishman, supra note 6, at 54-56.
108 For example, a person who tells others that he is switching phones to avoid detection is
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than conventional wiretaps, 109 Congress required a showing of need in order to
obtain a roving wiretap. 110
B. What Evidences a "Purpose to Thwart"?
The requirement of a probable cause showing of "purpose to thwart' is
subject to varied interpretation as to what exactly illustrates a purpose to thwart by
a suspect.' I Fortunately, Congress gave examples of what it envisioned in the
Senate report, which described "an alleged terrorist who went from phone booth
to phone booth numerous times to avoid interception." 112 A further example
given in the Report is: "A person whose telephone calls were intercepted who
said that he or she was planning on moving from phone to phone or to pay phones
to avoid detection also would have demonstrated that purpose." 1 3 However, such
purposeful action on the part of the suspect is no longer a prerequisite to the
roving wiretap. 14
one example of a "purpose to thwart interception" included in the legislative history of the
original roving wiretap statute. See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 32 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555,3586. This example is analogous to the definition of"purpose" as put forth
by the Model Penal Code-a conscious objective to cause such a result (here avoiding
surveillance).
109 See supra note 11.
I10 See Fishman, supra note 6, at 52 (explaining that an applicant must show why a roving
wiretap is needed). There is some speculation that the "purpose" requirement may not have
been solely for the protection of privacy interests but also for an interest in easing the burden of
the nation's telephone companies. See id. at 55-56 (explaining that one reason for the
"purpose" requirement was over concern raised by lobbyists for the telephone companies who
were fearful that roving wiretaps may be too burdensome because they would not be given
adequate notice).
I In determining if a suspect was "purposely" seeking to evade a conventional wiretap,
courts are left in a precarious position. They must rely on the affidavits of the investigating
officer to illustrate the evasive techniques employed by the suspect. The judge must determine
ifthe "techniques" employed by the suspect are evidence of a purpose to evade the wiretap. The
difficulty in such a determination is that the target is not available to explain why he switched
telephones. A suspect does not have the opportunity to explain his actions until after he has
been charged-and is now a defendant. See United States v. Villegas, No. 92 CR. 699 (CSH),
1993 WL 535013, at *10, *11 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 1993) (illustrating an example in which the
defendant argued, unsuccessfully, that his actions did not evidence a "purpose!' to thwart
detection).
112 S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 32 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.CA.N. 3555,3586.
113 Id.
114 With the "purpose" requirement removed, this leaves courts in a precarious position.
Courts will now have to define what type of conduct is required to be shown in order to obtain a
roving wiretap. The legislative history of the 1998 amendment is totally void of any indication
of what type of conduct would illustrate compliance with the "could have" standard of the new
statute. This Note sets forth one example in which a court could reasonably believe that the new
"could have the effect of' standard would be met. See infra Part IV.C. This example is
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C. Case History of the Roving Wiretap-Reliance on the "Purpose"
Requirement
The case authority on roving wiretaps is not voluminous by any means.115
Thus far, only two federal circuits have decided on the constitutionality of the
roving wiretap statute.1 16 Unfortunately, United States v. Petti117 is the only
federal circuit court case that contains more than a one-paragraph analysis of the
constitutionality of the roving wiretap statute.1 18
1. United States v. Petti
In United States v. Petti,1 19 Petti appealed the decision of the district court
that denied his motion to suppress the wiretap surveillance on grounds that the
roving wiretap statute was unconstitutional. 120 Specifically, the defendant argued
that the absence of the location from where the communication was to be
intercepted in an application for a wiretap violated the particularity requirement of
the Fourth Amendment.12 1 Put differently, the defendant argued that the roving
wiretap statute was unconstitutional because it did not require that the location of
the place from which the communication was to be intercepted be known at the
indicative of the types of conduct that courts will face when deciding whether to issue a roving
wiretap under the new standard.
115 A Westlaw electronic search indicated that six cases addressed the topic of roving
wiretaps as of March 3, 2000. Search of WESTLAW, Allfeds database (Mar. 3, 2000). More
case authority may address "roving bugs," which" appear in 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(a) (1994). As
the subsection concerning roving bugs does not have the "purpose" requirement that is
contained in the roving wiretap statute, this Note will limit analysis of cases to those concerning
roving wiretaps.
116 See, e.g., United States v. Gaytan, 74 F.3d 545 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Petti,
973 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1992).
117 973 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1992).
118 The only other circuit addressing the constitutionality of the roving wiretap statute
deferred to the reasoning ofthe Ninth Circuit in PeN" See United States v. Gaytan, 74 F3d 545,
553 (5th Cir. 1996) (upholding the § 2518(1 1)(b) without analysis, instead 'join[ing] the Ninth
Circuit['s]" analysis). Several district courts have also fielded the question of the
constitutionality of § 2518(1 1)(b). See, e.g., United States v. Silberman, 732 F. Supp. 1057
(S.D. Cal. 1990); United States v. Parks, No. 95 CR. 510, 1997 WL 136761 (N.D. 1ll. Mar. 24,
1997); United States v. Villegas, No. 92 CR. 699 (CSH), 1993 WL 535013 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22,
1993); see also United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112, 1120-24 (2d Cir. 1993) (analyzing the
constitutionality of the "roving bug" statute-18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(a) (1994)).
119 973 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1992).
120 See id at 1443.
121 See id at 1444. The Fourth Amendment requires that "no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, ... and particularly describing the place to be searched...." U.S.
CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
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time the wiretap order is issued.122
On appeal, the circuit court upheld the district court's decision; however, it
provided only cursory analysis. 123 The court based its decision on the fact that the
particularity requirement could be met even if the exact location or phone to be
searched is not specified.124 Reasoning that it might be impossible for federal
agents to know in advance from what location a defendant would use the
telephone, the court stated that agents could provide other information that would
effectuate the purpose of the particularity requirement.' 25
In Petti, the particularity requirement was met because the target was
identified in the application, and the government was able to "establish[ ] to the
court's satisfaction that it [was] impossible to specify the facilities because it
[was] the suspect's purpose to thwart interception by changing them."'126 Thus,
the "other information" that effectuated the particularity requirement was the
defendant's purpose to evade the wiretap.127 Moreover, the court also declared
that the target of the interception must be identified under the statute, and this
ensures that the particularity requirement will be met.128
2. In Accord with Petti
Of the federal courts that have addressed the constitutionality of the original
roving wiretap statute, all have found it to be constitutional. 129 In each of these
cases, the courts, in upholding the roving wiretap statute, relied on the statute's
requirement of showing a purpose to thwart surveillance by the target.130
122 See Petti, 973 F.2d at 1444.
123 See id. at 1445 (holding that the district court did not err when it found § 2518(1 1)(b)
to be constitutional).
12 4 See id at 1444 (citing United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 718 (1984) (holding that
law enforcement officers may satisfy the particularity requirement by providing information
other than the exact location)).
125 See id. The purpose of the particularity requirement is to prevent general searches. See
Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (explaining that "the manifest purpose of [the]
particularity requirement was to prevent general searches"); see also infra notes 135-44 and
accompanying text.
126 See Petti, 973 F.2d at 1445 (emphasis added).
127 See id The court explained that "the statute excuses failure to identify the particular
telephone facilities to be surveilled only if the government establishes to the court's satisfaction
that it is impossible to specify the facilities because it is the suspect's purpose to thwart
interception by changing them." Id.
128 See id
129 See, e.g., United States v. Gaytan, 74 F.3d 545, 553 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Silberman, 732 F. Supp. 1057, 1063 (S.D. Cal. 1990); United States v. Parks, No. 95 CR. 510,
1997 WL 136761, at *18 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 1997).
130 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1 1)(b)(ii) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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The analysis of the constitutionality of the original roving wiretap statute that
provides the most exhaustive analysis is provided by the district court in United
States v. Silberman.131 The Silberman court looked to legislative history to infer
what Congress's intent was in regard to the particularity requirement of the
Fourth Amendment and how that intent was to be met with the roving wiretap
statute. The court recognized that "Congress envisioned a 'relaxed specificity
order' in response to situations [in which the target was purposefully evading
detection]."'132 It found that the relaxed particularity requirement of the statute
complied with the Fourth Amendment because the "purpose' requirement and the
other requirements enumerated in the statute rescued it from being overly
broad. 133 The reliance on the "purpose" requirement along with the other
requirements seems to indicate that, taken together, the statute is constitutional.
Thus, when one of the factors is taken away, the constitutionality of the statute is
threatened.134
IV. TIm ABSENCE OF THE'TURosE TO THWAR'" REQU ENT RENDERS
THE ROVING WIRETAP STATUTE UNCONSnTUTIONAL
Few threats to liberty exist which are greater than that posed by the use of
eavesdropping devices.135
Electronic interception of communications is inherently intrusive and must be
narrowly tailored to conform to constitutional standards. Namely, warrants for
electronic interception must meet the same standards as those imposed on
conventional search warrants. This means that warrants for electronic surveillance
of communications must meet the requirements set forth in the Fourth
131 732 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd 973 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1992). The Ninth
Circuit deferred to the discussion in this case in its decision upholding the district court's
decision that 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) was constitutional. See United
States v. Petti, 973 F.2d 1441, 1445 n.4 (9th Cir. 1992), afg 732 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D. Cal.
1990); see also supra Part III.C.1.
132 Silberman, 732 F. Supp. at 1062 (quoting S. REP. No. 99-541, at 31 (1986), reprinted
in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555,3585).
13 3 See Silberman, 732 F. Supp. at 1062-63. The court found two other requirements of
the statute to be dispositive in its decision. First, the statute limits the number of people who
may issue a roving wiretap. Second, the statute limits interception of the conversations to only
those of the target. See id.
13 4 The courts, which addressed the constitutionality of the original roving wiretap statute,
did not plainly state that the "purpose" requirement was more important than any of the other
requirements. However, roving wiretaps evolved out of the frustration encountered by federal
investigators when a suspect was evading the detection of a conventional wiretap. It is therefore
unremarkable to suggest that the "purpose" requirement of the original roving wiretap statute is
the most important factor upon which the courts relied.
135 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63 (1967) (Clark, J.).
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Amendment; which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.13
6
Both Title I and the ECPA put significant burdens on government officials
who wished to conduct wiretap surveillance. The 1998 amendment removed the
key requirement imposed by the ECPA for a roving wiretap application. By
removing the "purpose" requirement from the statute, the 1998 amended roving
wiretap statute is unconstitutional because it fails to meet the particularity
requirement of the Fourth Amendment
A. The Fourth Amendment's Particularity Requirement
The Fourth Amendment requires that a search warrant will not be issued
unless it "particularly descnb[es] the place to be searched. .-137 By requiring
specificity of the location to be searched, the Framers of the Constitution intended
to prevent arbitrary searches that subject any area of a person's private dwelling to
government inspection. 138 According to one scholar on the law of search and
seizure, the particularity requirement protects individuals "from arbitrary and
oppressive searches and seizures and 'roving commissions.' 139
The particularity requirement is not easily met in warrants for roving wiretaps
or other electronic surveillance devices such as electronic beepers. 140 However,
the Fourth Amendment has been interpreted to conform to the changing times and
136 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
137 Id
138 See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (explaining that "the manifest
purpose of [the] particularity requirement was to prevent general searches"); see also United
States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 718 (1984) (requiring that the particularity requirement be met in
a warrant for an electronic beeper); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976)
(observing that the Framers of the Constitution included the particularity requirement to ensure
that a search warrant is not too broad); 2 JoHN WESLEY HALL, JR., SEARCH AND SEIZURE
§ 43:10, at 621 (2d ed., 1993) (finding that the particularity requirement is an imperative
requirement of any warrant); Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Fourth Amendment Analysis, 32
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 737, 768 (1992) (noting that the particularity requirement 'is crucial for
preventing general searches and seizures").
13 9 2 HALL, supra note 138, § 43:11, at 621.
140 This Note means "particularity requirement' in its traditional sense-the location of
the person or place to be searched. Roving wiretaps and search warrants for electronic beepers
cannot specify location because it is impossible to forecast where the target will use a telephone
or where an electronic beeper may travel.
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has "kept up" with technological advancements. 141 The Supreme Court has
recognized that the use of electronic devices sometimes makes it more difficult to
meet the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment.142 For example, the
Supreme Court in United States v. Karo held that although the exact location of
the place to be searched could not be identified, a search wan-ant was still
required.143 The Court further held that though the exact location could not be
identified, the government could meet the particularity requirement by providing
other information. 1"
B. Failing to Meet the Standard
The amended version of the roving wiretap statute145 is unconstitutional
because it fails to meet the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
Although the exact location of the place to be searched where a telephone will be
tapped does not have to be known,146 there must be other information provided in
the warrant application that sufficiently defines the place to be searched in order
to meet the particularity requirement. 147 This "other information" standard was
met in the original roving wiretap statute with the requirement of a showing of
141 The Fourth Amendment is not to be read literally. See Sean R. O'Brien, Note, United
States v. Leon and the Freezing of the Fourth Amendment, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1305, 1308-09
(1993) (explaining that because technology available to law enforcement allows greater
intrusions into individuals' lives, any changes should be translated into Fourth Amendment
law).
14 2 See Karo, 468 U.S. at 718.
143 See id.
144 It was impossible for the govemment to identify the place to be searched because the
purpose of the electronic beeper was to aid the agents in determining the location of illegal
activity. See id. at 715-17. The government argued that because it was impossible to meet the
particularity requirement, no search warrant should be required. See id. at 718. The Court
disagreed but held that the particularity requirement could be met by providing the following
information: a description of the object into which the beeper would be placed, the
circumstances that led the agents to wish to install the beeper, and the length of time for which
the beeper surveillance was requested. See id. According to the Court, these other factors would
satisfy the particularity requirement. See id.
14 5 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1 1)(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
146 See, e.g., Karo, 468 U.S. at 718; United States v. Gaytan, 74 F.3d 545, 553 (5th Cir.
1996); United States v. Petti, 973 F.2d 1441, 1445 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Silberman,
732 F. Supp. 1057, 1063 (S.D. Cal. 1990); United States v. Parks, No. 95 CR. 510, 1997 WL
136761, at *18 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 1997); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.4(3), at 159 (2d ed. 1992) (explaining that the particularity
requirement of the Fourth Amendment can be met in the absence of "[a]bsolute perfection in
description" if enough of a description is given to allow an officer to reasonably ascertain the
place to be searched).
147See Karo, 468 U.S. at 718 (holding that other information provided by law
enforcement agents may meet the particularity requirement).
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"purpose" to evade interception.' 48 The amended statute does not have the
"purpose" requirement and is, therefore, unconstitutional.
As discussed previously, the "other information" consisted of the following:
showing that the target was purposely trying to evade interception; demonstrating
the identity of the target; and specifying that only high-rankdng federal officials
could order a roving wiretap.' 49 The courts that upheld the constitutionality of the
roving wiretap statute all relied on these factors to find that the statute met the
particularity requirement.150
C. The "Could Have the Effect of Thwartng" Standard Will Result in
General Searches
The 1998 amendment's "could have" standard renders the statute
unconstitutional because it is a standard which is so easily met that it will enable
federal law enforcement officials to conduct general searches.151 Without having
to show that a suspect is purposely trying to evade detection, a law enforcement
officer will be able to obtain a roving wiretap based on everyday occurrences. In
essence, the "could have" standard will give officers "a roving commission to
'seize' any and all conversations." 152
Proponents of the amended roving wiretap statute might argue that the
requirement of identifying the target will prevent general searches. However, the
Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Berger v. New York.153 In Berger,
the Court recognized that the statute at issue required the identity of the person
whose communications were to be recorded.154 The Court held that this
requirement did not save the statute and "[did] no more than identify the person
whose constitutionally protected area is to be invaded rather than 'particularly
148 Congress envisioned a"relaxed specificity order" in the original roving wiretap statute.
United States v. Silberman, 732 F. Supp. 1057, 1062 (1990). The Silberman court recognized
that this relaxation of specificity could only comport with the Fourth Amendment if there were
"sufficien[t] ... justifications and limitations set forth in the statute." Id. In finding the original
roving wiretap statute constitutional, the court relied heavily on the "purpose to thwart"
requirement, stating that "[o]nce a judge has made a determination that the location of the
search is being purposefully changed in order to evade detection or interception by law
enforcement agents, an order with an expanded scope is clearly justified to counteract such
attempted evasion." Id (emphasis added).
14 9 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1 1)(b) (1994).
15 0 Seesupra Part III.C.
151 See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (explaining that the purpose of the
particularity requirement was to prevent general searches).
152 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 59 (1967).
153 Seeid
154 See id.
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describing' the communications, conversations, or discussions to be seized." 155
According to the Court, this left too much discretion to the officer executing the
wiretap and was, therefore, analogous to a general search.156
Likewise, the "could have" standard does not prevent general searches. It is a
standard that is too easily met to properly limit the intrusive nature of electronic
surveillance. Officials no longer have to show that a person is intentionally going
from one location to the next in an effort to evade wiretap surveillance. Rather,
officers must show only that the target is going from one location to the next. For
instance, an officer could merely show that by using the telephone in one's own
home and then in a friend's home, a suspect "could have the effect of thwarting
interception from a specified facility." 157 This results in general searches because
officers will be able to conduct wiretap surveillance at any home or location in
which the target makes a call without having to show that the target went to the
different location to evade a conventional wiretap.
Under the amended roving wiretap statute, a judge must issue a roving
wiretap if the applicant can make a probable cause showing that the suspect's
"actions could have the effect of thwarting interception from a specified
facility." 158 Accordingly, a judge would have to issue a roving wiretap in the
following scenario: Federal investigators are investigating a "small town" doctor
for RICO violations. The investigators have already obtained a search warrant to
wiretap the doctor's home telephone but are frustrated because the doctor is
frequently out of his home making "house calls." Under the amended roving
wiretap statute, the investigators can get a roving wiretap because the doctor's
actions (making house calls) could have the effect of thwarting a conventional
wiretap. Under the original version of section 2518(11), the investigators would
have to show that the doctor was going on these "house calls" with the purpose of
thwarting the conventional wiretap. However, under the amended version, the
investigators now only have to make a showing that by going from home to
home, the doctor's actions "could have" the effect of thwarting surveillance.
The scenario described above would allow investigators to conduct a general
search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. A roving wiretap issued on the
155 Id.
1 5 6 See id.
157 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). It may seem implausible that a
roving wiretap could be issued just because a suspect used a telephone at a friend's home. If,
however, the suspect frequently used the telephone at his friend's home, then a roving wiretap
could be issued. Under the original roving wiretap statute, such a scenario would not allow the
issuance of a roving wiretap. However, under the amended version's "could have" standard, a
roving wiretap would have to be issued under this same scenario. The statute requires only that
the target's actions "could have the effect of thwarting interception from a specified facility."
Therefore, by using a telephone other than the one on which a wiretap is placed, the suspect's
actions "could have the effect of thwarting interception" and thus a roving wiretap could be
issued.
158 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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facts in the scenario would lead to a general search because the officers would not
be required to particularly describe the communications to be seized. Instead, the
officers would be allowed to wiretap any phone that the doctor uses without
showing that he was using the phone in an effort to conduct illegal activity or to
thwart a conventional wiretap.
D. Obtaining Wiretaps-Now Easier Than Ever
Wiretaps are not difficult to obtain and requests for wiretaps are rarely, if
ever, revoked.159 The 1998 amendment will result in the issuance of even more
roving wiretaps. Proponents of the 1998 amendment may argue that this should
not be a concern because there were only twelve roving wiretaps applied for in
1997;160 however, just the opposite is true.
So few roving wiretaps were applied for because of the difficulty in obtaining
a roving wiretap under the original roving wiretap statute's "purpose"
requirement. 161 The requirement of showing a "purpose to thwart" on the part of
the suspect should not be seen as a difficulty but as a justified limitation on the
inherent intrusive nature of roving wiretaps. 162 With the removal of the "purpose"
requirement, roving wiretaps will parallel the demographics of conventional
wiretaps-which is not desirable.
In the last 10 years, there have been 10,347 electronic intercept applications
requested; of these, only 3 have been denied. 163 It is this type of deference to
granting wiretaps that is alarming. Because wiretapping is inherently intrusive,
there must be limitations on its availability. 164 It does not appear that the
proscriptions on electronic surveillance result in the rejection of electronic
159 For an analysis of the number of wiretaps requested and the number authorized, see
generally STATISmTCAL Div., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE UNrrED STATES COURTs, 1997 W.ETAP
REPORT (1998) [hereinafter 1997 WIRErAP REPORT].
160 In 1997, there were four total applications and four authorizations for federal roving
wiretaps. One was authorized in the District of Massachusetts for an investigation into an
extortion operation, and three more were authorized for narcotics investigations located in New
York and Virginia. In addition to the four federal roving wiretaps issued, eight were issued
under state roving wiretap statutes. Seven were for investigations into narcotics, and one was
issued for an investigation into gambling. See id at 8, 14.
161 Indeed, it was this "difficulty" that encouraged supporters of the amendment to seek
the removal of the "purpose' requirement See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text
16 2 See supra notes 11, 14, and accompanying text.
163 See 1997 WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 159, at 30. The 1997 Wiretap Report does not
break up this statistic into the different types of electronic surveillance. However, the report
indicates that normally telephone wiretaps vastly outnumber the other types of electronic
surveillance. For example, in 1997 telephone wiretap authorizations numbered 756, while all
other types ("bugs," electronic surveillance, and a combination of types) aggregated 338. See id.
at 27.
164 See supra note 11.
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surveillance applications.
Again, many proponents of electronic surveillance may argue that these
statistics illustrate that law enforcement officials have sought electronic
surveillance only when necessary and have followed the statutory proscriptions,
which would explain the high authorization rate. However, wiretapping is not as
successful as the authorization rates would lead one to believe.165 For example, in
1997, of the 2508 interceptions of communications by the federal government,
394 resulted in incriminating intercepts-only 16%.166 This means that the
federal government intercepted 2114 communications that were completely
innocent. This is where the concern lies. In one year, the federal government
listened to over 2000 innocent conversations.
Of the over 2000 innocent communications that were electronically
intercepted, a majority of them required a probable cause showing that the
location where the interception occurred was involved in criminal activity.167
Because roving wiretaps do not require this probable cause showing with respect
to the location, it is not difficult to imagine that they intercept many nonnefarious
communications. While this may seem "acceptable" in a year in which only
twelve total roving wiretaps were issued, it would not be acceptable if there were
one hundred roving wiretaps issued.
By removing the "purpose" requirement and replacing it with the "could
have' standard, Congress has laid the foundation for increased issuance of roving
wiretaps. Federal investigators will be able to utilize the roving wiretaps in
situations they never would have dreamed of under the original roving wiretap
statute.168 With increased numbers of roving wiretaps being issued, there will be
an increase in the number of innocent conversations that will be intercepted. 169
165 See HERMAN SCHWARTZ, TAPs, BUGs, AND FOOLING THE PEOPLE 26 (1977)
(acknowledging twenty years ago that wiretapping had not "accomplished... much").
166 See 1997 WIRETAP REPORT, supra note 159, at 21. This figure is the result of 563
interception orders that intercepted 2508 communications.
167 This is because only a "roving" wiretap or bug allows issuance without specificity of
location in the application. The 1997 Wiretap Report does not provide how many of these
intercepted "innocent' conversations were the result of roving surveillance. Because only
twelve total (federal and state) roving wiretap orders were issued in 1997, it seems likely that a
majority of these electronically intercepted, innocent conversations were intercepted through
conventional electronic surveillance methods.
168 See supra Part 1V.C.
16 9 Proponents of the amended roving wiretap statute may respond to this argument by
arguing that minimization principles will prevent the potential for innocent conversations being
intercepted. "Minimization" refers to the limits placed on what agents may and may not listen.
The principle is taken from 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5), which provides, in pertinent part, that each
intercept "shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications
not otherwise subject to interception" under the order. There are different ways in which
minimization can be effectuated. The method most commonly utilized is to rely on the agent's
good faith ability to record and listen to only conversations involving the target. See 1 FISHMAN
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Because roving wiretaps allow interception of communications from any phone
proximate to the target,170 there is a greater probability of innocent interception
than with conventional wiretaps.
The "purpose" requirement was instrumental in limiting the number of roving
wiretaps that were issued.171 If the 1998 amendment is allowed to stand, roving
wiretaps will begin to be issued with the same frequency as other types of
electronic surveillance. Given the leeway that a roving wiretap gives law
enforcement officers, this result cannot be allowed to come to fruition. Therefore,
it is imperative that courts find the amended roving wiretap statute
unconstitutional, thereby requiring Congress to replace the newly added "could
have" requirement with the original "purpose" requirement
V. CONCLUSION
"By its very nature eavesdropping involves an intrusion on privacy that is
broad in scope."' 72 The roving wiretap statute, as originally enacted, gave federal
investigators a potent weapon in their effort to intercept the communications of
suspected criminals. However, the statute contained significant safeguards that
limited the potential for abuse. Of these safeguards, the requirement that law
enforcement officials demonstrate that the suspect was purposely seeking to
thwart interception by changing facilities was the most significant, and in the
"legislative dead of night,"173 this requirement was eliminated.
The amended version of the roving wiretap statute replaces the "purpose"
requirement with a standard that is too transparent-the "could have" standard.
Courts must find that the amended statute is unconstitutional because it violates
the Fourth Amendment, thereby forcing Congress to put the "purpose"
requirement back into the statute. Only with the "purpose" requirement can the
roving wiretap statute meet the particularity requirement of the Fourth
Amendment.
& McKENNA, supra note 20, at §§ 14:1 to 14:23.
Minimization will not effectively reduce the number of innocent conversations that are
intercepted because of the deference to investigators in showing that they acted in "good-faith"
when following minimization guidelines. See id § 14:4 (explaining that the Supreme Court has
been very deferential to the government when questions of minimization arise).
17 0 See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
171 See supra note 75, at H9731 (statement of Rep. McCollum) (explaining that roving
wiretaps were too difficult to obtain).
172 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 56 (1967).
17 3 See Gillmor, supra note 67, at IC.
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